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 China became an attractive foreign investment destination after undergoing economic 
reforms in the late 1970s. Taking advantage of cheap labor and incentives offered by the Chinese 
government, Western companies began developing local operations that would prove to be 
profitable. Nevertheless, these companies can still have difficulty operating in a socialist-market 
economy. So what challenges might foreign companies encounter in China? This thesis answers 
such a question from three angles: political, cultural, and business processes. Political challenges 
encompass regulations and directives from the Chinese Communist Party that hamper foreign 
companies. Cultural challenges arise from companies’ unfamiliarity with Chinese cultural 
practices in business as well as with a unique consumer culture molded by novel technologies. 
Finally, business process challenges deal with issues that directly impact a company’s 
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 China, thanks in part to its large population, is one of the biggest markets in the world for 
Western businesses. Its centralized political system has nurtured a culture of speed and 
efficiency—qualities seductive to most companies. Under the rosy business picture, however, is 
an awkward relationship between the Western world and China that has given way to much 
misunderstanding on the global stage. The awkwardness arises from the friction between liberal 
democracies and a Communist state, between free markets and a controlled one. Naively, 
Western countries assumed that as China became richer, it would see the light of liberal 
democracy and capitalism and enter multilateral institutions, such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). They were only half right. While China became increasingly prosperous 
through the absorption of certain liberalistic elements, it has yet to veer from its authoritarian 
course. In light of the differences between China and the West, it can be difficult for Western 
companies to do business in China.  
 This thesis discusses the barriers that have arisen since Western companies entered China 
in the late 1970s to the present day. There are common challenges that affect many businesses in 
China. To simplify the many business challenges, they are assigned to three categories: political, 
cultural, and business processes (see Table 1). There remain challenges that are outside the scope 
of this thesis, such as capital controls, whose importance should not be discounted.  
Table 1 
Categories of Business Challenges 
Political 
State-owned Enterprises 




Intellectual Property Protection 
Data Security and Censorship 
Foreign Investment Law 
Cultural 
Cultural Integration 






 This thesis begins with a brief history of the transformation of the Chinese economy. 
After Deng Xiaoping took over from Mao Zedong, the first leader of Communist China, Deng 
instituted economic reforms that infused free market elements from the West and encouraged 
Western companies to invest in China. After Deng’s reforms, China sought entry into the WTO 
to take advantage of global trade networks. China’s rise to global status was not without 
problems. Oftentimes, WTO rules would conflict with China’s internal mode of operation. China 
would try to resolve each dilemma by instituting measures just vague enough to satisfy the 
international community yet carry on its preferred mode of operation.  
Following an exploration into China’s interaction with the WTO is a discussion on the 
current business challenges in China, segmented by three categories: political, cultural, and 
business processes. Political challenges deal with government policies and other actions from the 
central government and local officials, such as preferential treatment. In this section, the greater 
US-China relationship will be discussed, as the political sentiment that emerges from that 
relationship can affect business confidence.  
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Cultural problems deal with cultural differences in work expectations and behavior 
between Westerners and Chinese people. Many personal anecdotes, obtained either from 
interviews with foreign executives or books that business leaders have written, will be used in 
this section; these stories detail the stumbles that Westerners made while working in China. 
Aside from delving into historical culture, such as Confucianism, that remains a legacy in 
modern Chinese society, this thesis studies an evolving Chinese consumer culture shaped by 
rapid technological development. 
Business process challenges are issues that directly impact a company’s profitability. For 
example, increasing labor costs in China have become top-of-mind for many companies for the 
past decade. Growing concerns in recent times have been about Chinese competition and 
environmental regulations. The former has dented certain Western companies’ market share, 
while the latter has led to supply chain disruptions.  
Considering the heavy involvement of the Chinese government in its economy, culture, 
and society, every business challenge may include some combination of political, cultural, and 
business process elements. So, the three categories devised in this thesis should not be viewed as 
exclusive buckets with no connection to one another. The complexity and interaction of these 
issues come to bear in interviews with executives, business surveys released by trade groups, and 
news articles.  
The relationship between the Western world and China is intricate. There are benefits to 
collaboration among major world powers, but there are also tensions created from competing 
spheres of influence and opposing political and economic systems. Companies can be an 
important conduit between countries, inducing cooperation on global issues. Thus, it is helpful 
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for businesses to understand the scope of past, present, and future business challenges in China, 
as they venture into a foreign environment.  
 
History of Chinese Economy Before the World Trade Organization 
 After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Mao Zedong, at the 
helm of China’s centrally planned economy, instituted a series of reforms that sought to rapidly 
industrialize the Chinese economy. He failed miserably. His initial policies, collectively called 
the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962), led to mass famine and the deaths of millions of people. 
The Chinese society and economy then began recovering gradually through a rough 
implementation of decentralized ownership and decision-making. But the recovery was soon 
quashed in 1966 with the start of the Cultural Revolution, a political purging of purported non-
Communist elements in Chinese society. Such an upheaval severely disrupted the Chinese 
economy.  
 The death of Mao in 1978 and accession by Deng Xiaoping as paramount leader of China 
marked the beginning of the Chinese economy’s modernization. Deng saw an urgent need to 
modernize the economy and raise the living standards of the Chinese people. He broke away 
with Soviet-style economic policies by welcoming free market mechanisms, namely private 
enterprise and trade with the West. Deng directed economic resources toward four main 
modernizations—industry, agriculture, science and technology, and military.1 He recognized the 
need for China to open up to the outside world to embark on the path of modernization. So in 
1986, China formally submitted a bid to rejoin the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)—a global institution that sought to promote international trade—which China first left 
 
1 Interview with Craig Allen, President of the US-China Business Council 
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after the country turned Communist. On introducing free-market principles into China’s 
economic structure, Deng’s famously said: “Black cat, white cat, what does it matter what color 
the cat is as long as it catches mice?”2  
 The economic reform of China had great implications for the US. As China and the US 
established official diplomatic ties in 1979, the American business community saw a bright 
future in expanding to China. US Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into China first began to flow 
in the form of joint ventures (JV),3 an enterprise that consisted of American and Chinese 
partners. Most JVs were established in the export-oriented manufacturing sector to take 
advantage of China’s cheap and ample labor. To further attract foreign investment, Deng 
established 4 Special Economic Zones (SEZ)—Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, and Shantou—along 
the coast of China that operated on free-market policies with tax incentives, such as reduced 
corporate income tax. Deng would use such policies as experiments, implementing successful 
ones in other parts of the country. Under Deng, urban infrastructure investment exploded, and 
the Chinese economy modernized rapidly.4 
 However, trade and investment between China and the US were not unfettered. For 
example, the American Trade Act of 1974 and the Jackson-Vanik amendment to it were potential 
legal devices that could obstruct the countries’ nascent economic relationship. The Trade Act 
aimed to promote international trade, while protecting American industries negatively impacted 
by trade or unfair trade practices by other countries. The subsequent Jackson-Vanik amendment 
denied Most Favored Nation (MFN) status—an agreement that one country will offer another the 
 
2 Congressional Research Services, “China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, and Implications for the United States,” (2019): 
34. 
3 Ann Fenwick, “Equity Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of China: An Assessment of the First Five Years” The Business 
Lawyer 40, no. 3 (1985): 5.  




best trade terms—to countries with non-market economies, such as that of China, which 
restricted freedom of emigration and other human rights. While American presidents had 
routinely waived the requirements to confer China MFN status, the waiver had to be renewed on 
a yearly basis.5 The yearly review process meant that there was the looming possibility that US 
could revoke the waiver at any moment, which is exactly what happened after the Tiananmen 
Massacre in 1989. 
 In the late 1980s, a nascent market economy led to wealth inequality between urban and 
rural dwellers as well as between coastal and inland cities. Accelerated infrastructure and 
economic growth pushed inflation to grow out of control. Chinese students began worrying about 
employment prospects amidst economic transformation. All of these issues, combined with 
corruption and limited political freedom, ignited the Tiananmen Square Protests in 1989. 
Students, intellectuals, and activists alike demanded democratic reforms. Events took a turn for 
the worse when the Chinese government used force to quash the protests, ending in the deaths of 
thousands of protestors. 
 The gruesome massacre at Tiananmen prompted global backlash against the Chinese 
government, and the US revoked China’s MFN status. President George H.W. Bush 
subsequently ended high-level exchanges between American and Chinese officials as well as any 
military sales to China. A sharp drop in US-China trade soon followed. The American business 
community similarly denounced China’s actions, slowing FDI into China. Relations remained 
sour until 1993, when a tamed inflation in China and Deng’s new calls for reform signaled 
another wave of openness.  
 
5 Kerry Dunbaugh, “China’s Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) Status:  Congressional Considerations, 1989-1998,” Congressional 
Research Service (1998): 19. 
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 But the time after 1993 was different. The new Clinton administration conditioned 
China’s MFN status on human rights improvement. The newly-infused element of human rights 
in the US-China relationship created a schism between the administration and the American 
business community, who warned that a linkage between human rights reform and trade would 
cost the US billions of dollars in lost business.6 The New York Times described the concerted 
lobbying efforts of American businesses as “the most united display of corporate-lobbying 
muscle on a trade issue” since NAFTA debates in 1992.7 
 Eventually, American businesses succeeded in prodding the US government to once 
again grant China MFN status despite glacial progress in Chinese human rights reform. This 
move signified that the administration chose American trade development and the economy over 
human rights. As his final legislative legacy, Clinton secured a deal with China that granted the 
latter Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) in 1999, effectively removing the hassle of 
annually deciding on China’s MFN status. American businesses, which spent millions on TV 
advertisements lobbying for the agreement,8 applauded the decision. Conferring PNTR status to 
China paved the way for China to enter the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
 
China’s World Trade Organization Accession 
Entry into the WTO began when China secured the PNTR status from America in 1999. 
An agreement with America made agreements with other WTO countries more palatable. The 
Chinese leaders at the time, Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, favored an agreement with WTO 
countries because they believed WTO membership could improve China's international relations, 
 
6 Jim Mann and Rone Tempest, “US., China Trade Embittered Words on Human Rights,” LA Times, March 13, 1994. 
7 Neil Thomas, “For Company and For Country: Boeing and US-China Relations,” MacroPolo, February 26, 2019. 
https://macropolo.org/analysis/boeing-us-china-relations-history/ 




stimulate economic growth, and propel the reform process.9 They of course recognized the costs 
as well. They realized that that several disadvantaged sectors, such as agriculture, machinery, 
and automotive, would face stiff international competition. The Chinese negotiating team made 
several concessions that other Chinese bureaucrats did not favor—cutting tariffs by an average of 
23% and opening China's financial and telecommunications markets, 10 allowing the 
establishment of joint ventures in those sectors, which was previously forbidden.11 
 At one point, when talks had stalled between the two sides, Zhu appealed to the US 
business community, which in turn expressed its disappointment over the impasse. Soon after, 
the Clinton administration reached an agreement with China, as President Clinton intended to 
include China’s WTO accession as part of his legacy.12 While the terms of the WTO deal to 
which China agreed were considerably more stringent than those of other entrants,13 China 
accepted nonetheless. Many in the West celebrated this event, positing that the welcoming of 
China to an international rules-based system would gradually transform the Communist country 
into one that embraced Western values. Others were skeptical. Certain experts recognized the 
reality wherein barriers to conducting business would continue to exist. Larry Horwitz, senior 
economist at Primark Decision Economics, stated that "U.S. companies with joint ventures in 
China find difficulties actually running businesses in China, and that's going to take years to 
work out, with or without a trade agreement. That's the single biggest problem."14  
 
 
9 Hongyi Harry Lai, “Behind China’s World Trade Organization Agreement with USA,” Third World Quarterly 22, no. 2 (2001): 
238.   
10 “China, US Sign Trade Pact,” CNN Money, November 15, 1999. https://money.cnn.com/1999/11/15/worldbiz/wto/ 
11 Ibid. 
12 “An offer from China we shouldn't refuse,” Business Week, April 26, 1999.  
13 Lee Bransetter and Nicholas Lardy, "China's embrace of globalization,” National Bureau of Economic Research, (2006): 20.  




China’s Interaction with the World 
Why is it that even after China entered the WTO, the country was still enacting 
protectionist policies and other unfair trade practices? Although China agreed to the most 
restrictive compliance rules (versus any other entrant to the WTO), it is surprising that those 
rules do not seem to shackle China at all. Major sticking points of China’s WTO deal included, 
among other features, reduced tariffs—industrial tariffs were cut to 9.2% over the period of 
2002-10 from 16.3%—opening up services sectors, such as banking and telecommunications, 
ending export subsidies, and improving intellectual property protection.15 The liberalization of 
the Chinese market meant that American business opportunities could increase substantially, 
especially in areas previously closed to investment, such as telecommunications. Tyler Johnson 
of Dell Technologies wrote in his book, The Way of The LaoWai, "In China, you don't have to go 
after the whole market; you can find niches within which you can be extremely successful. Just 
1% market share in China is a huge number.”16 New niches opened, and US businesses were 
eyeing them.  
Data collected through surveys reflect a friendlier business environment in post-WTO 
China. A survey conducted by the American Chamber of Commerce in China (AmCham China) 
revealed in 2005 that 72% of respondents had “increased the number of their products and 
services available in China.”17 Whereas in 1999, only 24 percent of respondents were able to 
break into the Chinese market successfully.18 From 2005 to 2019, an overwhelming majority of 
companies have consistently reported that their China operations are profitable.19 In 2019, close 
 
15 Nicholas Lardy, “Issues in China’s WTO accession,” Brookings Institution, May 9, 2001. 
https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/issues-in-chinas-wto-accession/ 
16 Tyler Johnson, The Way of The Laowai (Austin: Lioncrest Publishing, 2019), 211. 
17 Betül Yüce Dural, “What Has Changed After the World Trade Organization Membership of China,” Anadolu University 
(2007): 7. 
18 Ibid. 
19 US-China Business Council, “USCBC Member Survey,” 2019.  
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to half of respondents claim that the profit margin of their operation in China are better than their 
overall operation.20 The benefits of conducting business in China are apparent.  
Yet the rosy profit picture masks the troubles for businesses on the ground. A disconnect 
emerges between countries’ expectation of China’s adherence to WTO rules and the reality of 
the situation. For instance, as previously mentioned, China was obligated by its WTO deal to 
open up certain sectors of its economy to foreign investment and joint-venture opportunities. 
Even so, foreign companies can still find themselves disadvantaged compared to their Chinese 
competitors. Example disadvantages include “China's use of technical standards, food-safety 
regulations, licensing requirements and professional qualifications among other non-tariff 
barriers” to limit foreign access to the Chinese market.21 Tyler Johnson also recounts in his book 
that “[the Chinese business environment] isn’t an open system, and there is a real lack of 
transparency as to how governments make decisions.”22 For now, American companies are 
coping with the challenges due to immense profits coming from China, but this can pose a 
serious challenge later on, when American companies are pushed out, simply because they have 
been outcompeted by Chinese companies.  
  China’s accession to the WTO was widely believed to be the country’s first step toward 
shifting to a market economy and becoming an adherent to international rules. President Clinton 
said, at the time, that the WTO deal was “a good agreement for China and for America and for 
the world. I think that all of us benefit when the most populous nation in the world is . . . part of 
a rule-based system that will bring shared prosperity.”23 Many more around the world shared a 
similar optimism. But they underestimated the Communist Party’s ever-tightening grip on the 
 
20 Ibid. 
21 Dural, “What Has Changed After the World Trade Organization Membership of China,” 10. 
22 Johnson, The Way of the Laowai, 327. 
23 Timothy Webster, “Paper Compliance: How China Implements WTO Decisions,” Michigan Journal of International Law 35, 
no. 3 (2014): 549. 
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Chinese economy and society, and they failed to understand the reality of China’s relationship 
with international rules. 
 When Xi Jinping ascended to General Secretary of the Communist Party in 2012, he 
began to consolidate power. By purging political opponents through his ostensibly well-
intentioned crackdown on corruption, he amassed power to himself. In 2017, he even enshrined 
“Xi Jinping Thought” in the Chinese constitution, raising himself to the stature of Mao and 
Deng. Under his leadership, the party began tightening its grip on the Chinese state. He has 
actively employed the governance mechanism of “leading groups,” which are extra-
constitutional organizations that carry out specific state mandates and policy objectives. Less 
utilized by Xi’s predecessors, such groups contributed immensely to reforms of the state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) in Xi’s first five years as leader.24  
Signaling the government’s refusal to transition fully to a market economy, the Chinese 
government has continued to strengthen the role of SOEs.25 South China Morning Post reported 
that the assets of state-owned non-financial enterprises rose 8.4% from a year earlier to $26 
trillion at the end of 2018, while profits increased 12.9% year on year to $49 billion.26 In the 
2018 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, the authors write that “the 
principal beneficiaries of China’s policies and practices are China’s state-owned enterprises and 
numerous other significant domestic companies, sometimes referred to as ‘national 
champions.’”27 As China modernized, many assumed the country would take on the Western 
model of separation of powers, instead of a consolidation of powers. The West not only 
 
24 Wendy Leutert, “Firm Control: Governing the State-Owned Economy Under Xi Jinping,” China Perspectives (2018): 29. 
25 Frank Tang and Echo Xie, “China’s Reform of SOE Questioned After Beijing Appoints Inexperienced Official to Head Assets 
Watchdog,” South China Morning Post, May 21, 2019. https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3011111/chinas-
soe-reform-questioned-after-beijing-appoints  
26 Ibid. 
27 “2018 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance,” Office of the United States Trade Representative (2019): 11. 
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miscalculated China’s governance trajectory, but it also wrongly predicted China’s relationship 
with the world.  
 Looking back on China’s international behavior, many scholars have argued that China 
has extracted all the benefits of being a part of international institutions without paying the full 
costs.28 The reality is more nebulous. In practice, China seems to incorporate policies and 
regulations selectively to not compromise domestic goals.29 Compliance with the WTO is a 
prime example. In line with the international body, China has lowered tariffs, improved market 
access (though there are still restrictions in certain sectors) and strengthened a rules-based 
judicial system. Yet at the same time, China still lacks transparency in governmental and 
regulatory procedures, strong intellectual property protection, and the dedication to curb state 
capitalism—state-controlled economic activity—all of which violate WTO regulations.  
The USTR details continuous concerns on China’s “shield[ing] massive sub-central 
government subsidies from the scrutiny of WTO members”30 and undermining of WTO councils 
and committees designed to monitor a member’s compliance with WTO. They admit that the 
WTO alone may not be sufficient to enforce China’s compliance. The body is designed around 
members already committed to free-market principles, not for a country that is insistent on 
maintaining state-led components.31 The argument of the inability of WTO to rein in China is 
used as a justification for the Trump Administration’s unilateral decision to apply tariffs on 
China.32 Aside from blatant violations, China also engages in “paper compliance,” 33 a much 
subtler form of undermining international rules.  
 
28 Webster, 527. 
29 Ibid, 528.  
30 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 22. 
31 Ibid, 23. 
32 Ibid, 24. 
33 Webster, 529. 
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 Up until 2014, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), WTO’s dispute settlement 
mechanism, has resolved eight cases against China regarding incompliance with WTO 
regulations.34 In five of the eight cases, China revised laws to address the complainant’s 
concerns.35 On the surface, China was receptive to DSB’s rulings to change inconsistent 
measures. Upon closer examination, however, China tinkered with the inconsistencies in a way 
that minimized the rulings’ intrusiveness.36  
In one instance, the US challenged three aspects of China’s intellectual property (IP) 
protection policies. DSB found two of the claims valid. China then agreed to amend the rules in 
response to the two valid claims: the unavailability of copyright protection for works not 
authorized for publication;37 and the disposal methods for counterfeit goods.38 For the first claim, 
before the DSB ruling, China’s copyright law read: “works the publication or dissemination of 
which is prohibited by law shall not be protected by this Law. Copyright owners, in exercising 
their copyright, shall not violate the Constitution or laws or prejudice the public interest.”39 
China then amended the rule to reflect WTO compliance: “[c]opyright holders shall not violate 
the Constitution or laws or jeopardize public interests when exercising their copyright. The State 
shall supervise and administrate the publication and dissemination of works in accordance with 
the law.”40 China removed the first sentence in the original rule and added a new sentence to the 
revised measure. The new law complies with the DSB ruling: it no longer states explicitly 
 
34 Ibid, 556. 
35 Ibid, 556. 
36 Ibid, 556. 
37 Ibid, 558. 
38 Ibid, 560. 
39 Hong Xue, “A User-Unfriendly Draft: 3rd Revision of the Chinese Copyright Law,” Info Justice, April 25, 2012. 
http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/hongxue042012.pdf. 
40 Webster, 561. 
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copyright protection is not given to unauthorized works. However, the Chinese government still 
maintains the power to decide whether a work would be granted copyright protection.41  
 In response to the second claim on not preventing the selling of counterfeit goods, China 
revised its law to state: “imported goods bearing a counterfeit trademark shall not, except in 
special circumstances, be permitted to enter the stream of commerce upon merely removing the 
trademark from the goods.”42 The operative word here is “imported.” China is one of the largest 
producers of counterfeit goods. So by adding the qualification of imported counterfeit goods, 
China drastically limits the scope to which the law is applied. Such ineffectual revisions put 
China’s commitment to WTO into question.43 Although the IP challenge is just one example of 
paper compliance, it shows China’s power to circumvent international regulations and should 
caution foreign countries in expecting China’s adherence to a rules-based system.  
  
Political Challenges   
 Political challenges originate from the Communist Party’s (CPC) control over the 
Chinese economy and its ability to intervene in the operations of individual companies. Reasons 
for intervention can range from an involvement of politically sensitive topics, such as Hong 
Kong or Taiwan, to strategically disadvantaging foreign rival companies in order to foster 
domestic dominance.  
The CPC is a byword for absolute control. Western companies are at the mercy of the 
political directives, and there is almost no way around this issue. If the CPC decided to launch an 
investigation into a company, it can do so by pulling a justification out of thin air. The Party’s 
 
41 Ibid, 559.  
42 Ibid, 560. 
43 Ibid, 561. 
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desire for control stems from its need to maintain party legitimacy and establish its power over 
the country and its citizens. Foreign cultural influence in general is seen as an eroding agent of 
such power and an ideological threat to China. In 2014, the South China Morning Post reported 
that ideological threats were considered by a new national security committee in China as an 
unconventional security threat that needs to be targeted.44 In such a context, Western companies 
have to be very careful in navigating the political waters of China. As of this writing, Hong 
Kong, a Chinese territory, is embroiled in protests over the Hong Kong people’s expectations of 
democratic reforms, among other demands. To mainland China’s discontent, many individuals 
and organizations have taken up the chant of “free Hong Kong” in a show of support for 
democracy. This type of support comes with dire business consequences.  
Perhaps one of the most recent, notorious examples of China’s retaliation for 
organizations supporting the Hong Kong protests happened to an American entity. Daryl Morey, 
the general manager for the Houston Rockets, a professional basketball team, tweeted out an 
image that showed support for the protests on October 4th. The Chinese reacted swiftly and 
furiously. Almost immediately, Chinese broadcasters said they would stop broadcasting National 
Basketball Association (NBA) games, and the Chinese Basketball Association said they would 
suspend ties with the Rockets. One tweet put in jeopardy the $1.5 billion deal that the NBA had 
reached with Tencent, a Chinese media outlet, to stream NBA games in China, which has around 
500 million fans.45 This is only one of many instances.  
 
44 Teddy Ng, “’Cultural threats’ among five focuses of new national security panel, colonel says,” South China Morning Post, 
January 14, 2014. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1404926/cultural-threats-among-five-focuses-new-national-security-
panel-colonel 





The Washington Post reported that Tiffany & Co., a luxury jewelry retailer, had to 
remove a global advertising image that some in China thought implied support for Hong Kong 
protesters, “even though the company said the image was taken weeks before the demonstrations 
began.”46 The same report revealed that Blizzard Entertainment, a video-games company, 
suspended a professional player for his support of the protests in an interview.  
Multinational companies, lest they get shut of the China market, tiptoe around sensitive 
political issues. Western firms can be caught in the crosshairs if the firm’s origin country 
experiences friction politically with China. FedEx Corporation, a US parcel delivery company 
with a global presence, is a prime example. As the US-China trade war raged on in 2018, China 
abruptly, or so it seemed to the West, launched an investigation into FedEx over its accidental 
misdirection of certain packages belonging to Huawei Technologies Co., a Chinese 
telecommunications giant. However, Chinese officials deny any connection between the FedEx 
probe and the trade war. Many Western pundits and editorials argue that China is retaliating 
against the US for the trade war and the latter’s clampdown on Huawei products.47  
Xi Jinping’s rise to power since 2012 has seen the Party strengthen its control over the 
entire country. Xi has been touted to be the most powerful president since Mao, as no president, 
other than Mao, has had his ideology enshrined in the constitution of China as “thought.”48 Xi’s 
idea for a new era is that of “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”49 To fulfill his vision, Xi 
Jinping seeks absolute unity at home and influence abroad, exemplified by his Belt and Road 
 
46 Jeanne Whalen, et al., “China lashes out at Western businesses as it tries to cut support for Hong Kong protests,” Washington 
Post, October 8, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/10/08/china-lashes-out-western-businesses-it-tries-cut-
support-hong-kong-protests/ 
47 Trefor Moss, “FedEx caught in US-China tensions,” The Wall Street Journal, June 1, 2019. 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/fedex-caught-in-u-s-china-tensions-11559404746 
48 “Xi Jinping ‘most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong’,” BBC, October 24, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-china-41730948 
49 Elizabeth Economy, “China’s imperial president: Xi Jinping tightens his grip,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 6 (2014): 80. 
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Initiative. In the name of unity, Xi embarked on an anti-corruption campaign that removed 
corrupt government officials and military personnel. China observers posited that such a move 
was a convenient method for Xi to solidify power by purging his opponents.50  
Such a political move had implications for foreign businesses, especially those in the 
luxury goods industry. In 2014, Bank of America Merrill Lynch revealed that Chinese GDP in 
that year could fall by as much as 1.5 percentage points due to declining sales of luxury goods 
and services—dominated by the likes of Gucci and Louis Vuitton—which officials used to 
indulge in for special occasions and, oftentimes, buy political favors.51 Naturally, once the 
campaign began, government officials became very cautious about over-spending on lavish items 
and thus decreased their spending.  
 
Political Challenges: State-Owned Enterprises 
 If Xi Jinping thought is to permeate through Chinese society, it naturally extends to the 
businesses within its borders. Political control of business is most readily seen among state-
owned enterprises (SOE). According to a report by The Economist in 2018, SOEs took up 40% 
of China’s stock market and one-third of its investments.52 SOEs operate at the Party’s direction; 
their executives are appointed by the Party, and they receive preferential treatment, such as 
cheaper capital and land. The preferential treatment that SOEs have received, which are 
unavailable to foreign-invested enterprises and Chinese-owned private enterprises, has been a 
major contention between Western firms and China. Beginning in 2018, the trade war between 
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the US and China was in part started due to market distortion by the government subsidies to 
SOEs, which unfairly disadvantage foreign companies.53  
An analysis of annual business surveys released by the US-China Business Council 
(USCBC) reveals that Chinese protectionism, regulatory approval, and other issues dealing with 
unequal treatment between Chinese companies and American companies have consistently 
ranked among the top 10 challenges for US businesses in the past few decades. Most recently in 
2019, 84% of American companies reported some type of protectionism in China.54  
Even private Chinese companies recognize the favoritism received by SOEs. According 
to a report by The Economist in 2019, certain private Chinese companies would directly 
proclaim themselves as SOEs—when in fact they are not—for the purpose of securing loans and 
investment.55  For example, China Nuclear Engineering Corporation misled creditors with claims 
of state connections, when in fact, the company that had real state connections went by the name 
of China Nuclear Engineering and Construction Corporation (spot the difference). Apparently, 
Chinese banks are much more willing to lend to SOEs as opposed to private enterprises, because 
they trust that the government looks after its own.  
The protectionist measures echo Xi’s nationalist political agenda. The president 
advocates for Chinese self-sufficiency, leading the world in every aspect from technology to 
military. But it is exactly his vision for China’s place in the world that contradicts the business 
environment at home. In speeches to foreign audiences, Xi touts China’s commitment to 
promoting “multilateral trading systems and free trade.”56 But at home, Xi proclaims the need for 
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SOEs to become “stronger, better and larger.”57 On the one hand, Xi reflects positively on free 
market policies that have treated China well. And on the other, Xi encourages the continual 
development of a sector that is inherently incompatible with the liberal international order. It 
certainly makes one wonder: which Xi is the truthful one?  
Xi’s seemingly contradictory strategy fits China’s post-WTO strategy of utilizing global 
world order to further its own development. In the 2018 Report to Congress on China’s WTO 
Compliance, the authors concluded:  
“the government and the Party permit market forces to operate only to the extent 
that they accord with the objectives of national economic and industrial policies. 
When there is conflict between market outcomes and state objectives, the 
government and the Party intervene to ensure that the state’s objectives prevail.”58  
 
China does not just seek to extend political influence in its own companies, it tries to do so with 
foreign ones as well. According to the aforementioned report to Congress, China has attempted 
to insert so-called “Political Committees” in foreign enterprises. In one example, unnamed 
German companies were affected. The Federation of German Industries stated in its 2019 Policy 
Paper:  
“The direct influence of the state or the party in corporate decisions is being 
expanded through a political upgrading of party cells. These intervene not only in 
the decision-making processes of state-owned enterprises but also in joint 
ventures and private enterprises.”59  
 
Echoing the same alarming trend, the European Chamber of Commerce expounded further that it 
is not aware of any legal basis for the insertion of party cells in joint ventures.  
Fears of the Communist Party controlling foreign firms through party committees may be 
overblown. USCBC finds that although there is indeed a company law in China that requires any 
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company with three or more party members to form a party committee within the company, the 
law does not give the party organization any specific role of a managerial or decision-making 
nature.60  
The reality is that foreign companies cannot escape Party influence if they want to 
operate in China. All companies entering China must be prepared for the prospect of government 
interference. As the authors in the 2019 AmCham China White Paper write, “China has shown a 
distressing propensity to retaliate without legal justification against [foreign-invested 
enterprises].”61 In a socialist-market economy where the central government directs the economy, 
any operation is exposed to the Communist eye. Any foreign company hoping to counter 
malpractice by government-favored Chinese companies has to proceed at its own risk, as the 
Chinese judicial system is not fully independent and can pass biased judgements.  
 
Political Challenges: Social Credit System 
 Perhaps a more intricate form of political control that has serious ramifications for 
foreign businesses is the social credit system (SCS). SCS is a difficult concept to grasp because 
of its fragmentation—many cities have different pilot programs testing out various versions of 
the SCS. SCS can be seen as a mechanism that incentivizes the citizenry to follow rules. For 
example, one might be penalized for jaywalking, or one might be rewarded with free services for 
maintaining a high social credit score. According to Jeremy Daum, a senior research fellow at 
Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center in Beijing, another main goal for the government in 
 
60 Jake Laband, “Fact Sheet: Communist Party Groups in Foreign Companies in China,” China Business Review, May 31, 2018. 
https://www.chinabusinessreview.com/fact-sheet-communist-party-groups-in-foreign-companies-in-china/ 
61 American Chamber of Commerce in China, “2019 American Business in China White Paper,” 7. 
24 
 
experimenting with the system is to have unified records of its people among different agencies 
to enhance interdepartmental communication.62  
In the West, many media platforms deride the system as Orwellian. Inspired by dystopian 
science fiction, like Orwell’s 1984, they have set out to further boost the narrative of China as an 
ominous, mass surveillance state with limited regard for personal freedom. Having an 
uneducated perspective of the social credit system can affect the hiring practices of foreign 
companies. Conny Jakobsson, managing director of a Swedish company operating in China, 
claimed that many foreign executives he spoke to are intimidated by the prospect of working in 
China because of the SCS.63 According to Henri Manner, managing director of a strategic 
personnel solutions firm, a deterrence of foreign executives would impact small to medium-sized 
foreign companies especially, which hire more foreign executives than bigger companies.64 
The Chinese government can impose penalties on companies through the SCS.65 If 
authorities from one department decide to penalize a company on, say, violating environmental 
regulations, that penalty could affect the company’s relations with authorities from other 
departments. Previously, as China’s commercial system developed, there was not a lot of 
interdepartmental communication. So even if a company had trouble with authorities from one 
province, it could operate business as usual in another. Now with the advent of the SCS, 
communication and record-keeping across authorities could be more organized. Kyle Freeman 
gave the example that if one owns an export company in an inland province, and the company 
somehow received a bad social credit score, then the potentially instantaneous scoring system 
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could be updated in systems across China and hold up export products in a port city.66 A major 
flaw in the SCS as described in this instance is that there is currently no detailed information on 
how exactly real-time scoring is implemented across authorities.  
SCS still has kinks in its process. These kinks have unfairly impacted even companies 
who have operated strictly in accordance with the rules. For example, Freeman relayed the story 
of one of his clients, a sizeable German company (unnamed for privacy reasons). The company 
maintained good internal controls and did not break any laws. Yet, it still received a bad score. It 
turned out that other, still nameless, Chinese companies had counterfeited the German 
company’s products. Consumers, having bought the counterfeited, shoddy products, ended up 
complaining to the authorities about the German company, giving it a bad score. But by the time 
the German company realized what had happened, the window for lodging objections with the 
scoring authorities had passed. This incident indicates that more work remains to be done in 
verifying the assignment of scores to companies.  
Another implication of the SCS is that it can become yet another tool of market control 
for the Communist Party. Under a well-developed SCS, the Party can further liberalize market 
access rules, but still control players in the market with scoring. Currently, the Chinese 
government subjects companies to random inspections, and there is leeway in negotiating the 
result. But with SCS and its instantaneous scoring across authorities, negotiation room may be 
limited. This means that companies will need to be vigilant at all times about their internal 
controls and in monitoring any changes in regulation. Freeman said that some foreign companies 






to log onto the local SCS and view one’s company score. However, it is still unclear as of yet 
how local systems will feed into the national system.  
Favoring state-owned enterprises and the implementation of SCS are just two specific 
methods for the Chinese government to gain leverage. The clash that usually occurs between the 
Party and Western companies results in divergent expectations. Back home in the US or a 
European country, companies enjoy clearly defined rules with effective enforcement 
mechanisms. In most cases, the clarity of law has instilled in Western companies a receptiveness 
to compliance. Looking beyond the home country, companies seeking to expand in WTO 
member countries—there are 164 of them—usually expect comparable treatment, given that the 
rules of the WTO, under heavy influence from Western countries, ensure fair and free market 
conditions. Yet expectations do not apply to a country powerful enough to spurn global rules. 
Companies that have long enjoyed playing in home court advantage are now realizing that they 
are no longer in control.  
 
Political Challenges: Market Access 
 China controls market access, and companies cannot enter whenever they please. The 
issue of market access has historically been one of the most poignant issues for foreign 
companies entering China. In the 2019 AmCham China white paper, the authors write that  
“many challenges stem from market access restrictions, which inhibit the business 
operations of over half of survey respondents; challenges are particularly acute in 
the Technology and Other R&D-intensive sector, with over 75% of members 
reporting issues.”68  
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The cited survey refers to an annual business questionnaire that AmCham China sends to 
companies with operations in China.69 It gauges companies’ opinions about the business 
environment in China as well as key challenges they tend to encounter. Market access also serves 
as a basis for the Trump administration as a reason for the trade war.70  
 China employs market access restrictions to develop its own economy and technological 
capability. Market access restrictions have typically been linked with forced technology 
transfers. Companies who wish to establish a foothold in China would give up their technology 
to their local partners in order to operate in the country.71 Not just induced by the free-market 
reforms of the late 1970s, China’s rapid economic expansion is also fueled by a rapid import of 
advanced technologies from abroad. In the late 1990s, China had established entities called 
National Engineering Research Centers, whose purpose was to spur domestic innovation. To that 
end, they were allowed to “actively import, digest and absorb foreign technologies so as to 
support enterprises in their technological progress and structural readjustment.”72 
 Forced technology transfer (FTT) remains a serious issue to this day. A USTR report 
concludes that the Chinese government continues to pressure technology transfer from U.S. 
companies through ownership restrictions, such as joint-venture requirements, and market access 
status.73 FTT poses an issue for companies, because strategic innovations can be transferred 
away to support state industrial policies, like Made in China 2025 (a directive that focuses on 
high-tech industries, such as artificial intelligence). Alternatively, technology transference can 
give rise to Chinese competitors, compared to whom the foreign company will no longer have a 
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competitive advantage. Official studies released by the International Trade Commission, among 
other agencies, on Chinese practices of FTT have estimated that the losses imposed on US 
companies have been in the tens of billions.74  
 A recent development in China’s economic policies, however, can potentially do away 
with FTTs. The Foreign Investment Law that passed in March 2019—going into effect January 
1, 2020—is supposed to improve intellectual property protection of investors and ban any type of 
forced technology transfers.75 Given the brand-new status of the law, it remains to be seen how 
such policies will fare in practice. There remains the possibility of the government exploiting 
loopholes within the law to pressure companies to give up their technology. 
 But even if FTT no longer becomes a problem, market restrictions are not going away 
anytime soon. In recent years, “Negative Lists” (NL) have been used to direct foreign 
investment. NLs fall within two main categories: prohibited and restricted. Investors are 
absolutely not allowed in prohibited industries, such as metallurgy and mining. On the other 
hand, investors can enter restricted industries only under very specific conditions, like ownership 
restrictions. For example, the 2019 NL stipulates that the ratio of foreign shares in securities 
companies cannot exceed 51%.76 Conversely, there is an encouraged investment catalogue, 
which one might consider a “Positive List” (PL), that lists the industries that welcome foreign 
investors. Given President Xi’s vision for China to lead the world in cutting-edge technology, PL 
example industries include electronics and information technology. The lists differ among 
various geographical regions. For both the NL and PL, there is a national version as well as 
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regional ones. In the NL, a distinction is made regarding foreign investment in Free Trade Zones 
(FTZ), a class of SEZ that incentivizes foreign investment. Shanghai, for instance, was China’s 
first FTZ.  
 Because FTZs are friendlier to foreign investment, there are usually fewer entries on the 
NL in FTZs than national ones—vice versa for PL. In the 2019 Foreign Investment Law, the 
Chinese government effectively legalized its use of NL and PL to manage trade.77 Many 
investors may perceive such a move as government hostility towards the outside world. 
Analyzing a trend of NL and PL entries paints a different picture. Since 2011, the number of 
prohibited or restricted industries has steadily gone down from 180 in 2011 to 40 industries in 
2019. The number of encouraged industries has increased to 415 in 2019, compared with 348 
back in 2017. 78 Considering the long-term trend, the status of market access seems to be headed 
in a favorable direction for foreign investors.  
 This phenomenon begs an important question: is China opening up its market out of 
consideration for foreign investors, or is it opening up because it’s confident in the dominance of 
its domestic companies? To the world, China would most likely express the former. However, 
the reality may be closer to the latter. The attempt of card payment companies, such as Visa and 
MasterCard, to enter the Chinese market presents a prime example.  
 After joining the WTO in 2001, China was expected to allow foreign bank card 
companies to process payments made in Chinese yuan. The Chinese government refused to do so 
until 2018, when it finally announced the loosening of entry into the financial sector. Meanwhile, 
a Chinese company, UnionPay, developed a monopoly in the domestic payment market.79 
 
77 Ibid.  
78 Zoey Zhang, “China’s 2019 Negative Lists and Encouraged Catalogue for Foreign Investment.” 




American Express was the first company of its kind to officially enter the Chinese market in 
2018, under a joint-venture requirement. At that point, American Express not only had to 
compete with UnionPay for credit card payments, but it also had to contend with the 
overwhelming trend of mobile payments, supported by companies, such as Alibaba and Tencent. 
Over 550 million users rely on mobile payments in all aspects of life, rendering credit cards 
unnecessary.80 While mobile payments do not yet cover the entire Chinese population, it is 
entirely possible that they will. When they do, American Express, along with any other foreign 
card companies, will have no place in the country.  
 The case study of card companies prompts the serious question of whether it still matters 
for China to open its markets. If a certain industry is finally opened up for foreign investment, 
but the market has already been saturated with Chinese businesses or Chinese consumers have 
already adopted a behavior unsuitable for foreign businesses, foreign companies would be 
outcompeted, rendering the “opening” pointless.   
 
Political Challenges: Intellectual Property Protection 
 For companies operating in China, intellectual property (IP) protection remains a key 
obstacle. In 2018, the Senate Intelligence Committee released a report that stated for the 7 years 
leading up to 2018, “more than 90 percent of the Department [of Justice]'s cases alleging 
economic espionage by or to benefit a state involve China, and more than two-thirds of the 
Department's theft of trade secrets cases have had a nexus to China.”81 The looming threat of IP 
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theft and the general lack of IP protection have deterred many companies from committing 
further investment and innovation efforts to China. The most recent Business Climate Survey, 
released by AmCham China, cites that nearly 35% of respondents revealed that a “lack of 
sufficient IP protection prevents them from increasing innovation in China, up from around 32% 
in 2017.”82 Over half of respondents claimed that the risks of “IP leakage and data security are 
greater in China than elsewhere.” The perennial worry for IP protection may continue for 
investors, given that China is now guiding foreign investment toward industries like high 
technology, where copious amounts of patents originate.  
 But just like its judicial system, China’s IP protection policies have been gradually 
improving. The General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the 
State Council have jointly issued opinions to allocate more judicial resources toward IP 
protection;83 a new IP division was established in the Supreme People’s Court in 2019 as well.84 
As China itself embarks on a path of sophisticated innovation, it needs to enhance IP protection 
for its own benefit. Protecting foreign investors is perhaps just a convenient move, but it could 
also be a sign that China perceives international pressure to change its IP protection regime. The 
flurry of 2019 IP-related policies, which emphasizes China’s commitment to improve IP 
protection, comes in the thick of a trade war with the US, one of whose key demands was to have 
better protection of IP.85  
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 Chinese officials’ enforcement of the law may deviate from the letter of the law. As of 
2019, China ranks 78 out of 126 countries for regulatory enforcement in the 2019 Rule of Law 
Index from the World Justice Project.86 Weak regulatory efforts may be attributed to expansive 
and vague wording of laws. Local officials across different regions have difficulty performing 
consistent enforcement of the law, when there is plenty of room for interpretation. Abstract 5-
year plans start at the very top and flow downward to delegated departments to craft concrete and 
specific regulations. Regulators often do not know how to implement the policy directives given 
to them and may purposely leave room for ambiguous laws to achieve flexibility. Online 
counterfeiting is an example.  
 China’s growth in the e-commerce space has been rapid. According to McKinsey & 
Company, a consultancy, in 2019 China’s online retail market was close to $1.5 trillion, larger 
than the next ten markets combined.87 Foreign businesses, through e-commerce platforms like 
Alibaba or JD.com, understandably want a slice of the ever-growing pie. Such businesses create 
a new classification for themselves: foreign companies doing business with Chinese consumers, 
even if not physically located in China.  
 A report by the South China Morning Post claimed that in 2015, more than 40% of goods 
sold online in China were either counterfeits or of bad quality.88 A new E-Commerce Law (ECL) 
released in 2019 was designed to bring order to hectic online marketplaces.89 However, the law 
still comes with insufficient provisions that may increase the difficulty for foreign companies to 
combat counterfeiting practices. For example, under the ECL, after an e-commerce platform 
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operator receives a statement of non-infringement—essentially a declaration from a seller that its 
products are proprietary—from a seller, the seller only has a 15-day period to file a complaint 
against anyone who has infringed on its IP. That is nearly impossible for any foreign IP holder to 
do, because the process to gather and notarize the right documents would take much longer than 
the allotted time. According to the 2019 AmCham China White Paper, “the final version of the 
E-Commerce Law leaves much to be desired and could even potentially incentivize and 
embolden infringers.”90 
 Amidst the general trend of concern for Chinese IP threat, two entrepreneurs stand out. 
Musa Ato is a Nigerian entrepreneur in Austin who intends to start his own clothing store, 
League of Rebels, in Chengdu, China. When asked whether he is worried about the infringement 
of his trademark, he replies no.91 He takes comfort in the fact that his operation will be small, but 
also recognizes that he needs to play by another country’s rules if he wants to thrive there. He 
attributes part of his nonchalance on the issue to his familiarity with how Nigeria operates, which 
is apparently similar to the way China operates. Ato is therefore perplexed by foreign 
companies’ complaints about China.  
 Dr. Forrest Fabian Jesse is another entrepreneur undaunted in the face of the China 
challenge. In 2012, Dr. Jesse built XiXuan Laboratory in Beijing as part of his PhD process. 
XiXuan focuses on high-end technologies, such as neural circuits—a facet of artificial 
intelligence. Given the IP-heavy nature of his work, one would immediately assume that IP 
protection is of the utmost concern to him. His calm demeanor on the topic reveals otherwise. he 
seems trusting of the Chinese IP system and the prowess of his people who are tasked with 
navigating such a system. He believes that in IP negotiations, local people are needed for “local 
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contextualization.” Preparation for potential IP infringement issues to arise is especially key. He 
believes that “if there is fear [over IP], it just means you’re not prepared enough.”92 
 
Political Challenges: Data Security and Censorship 
 As intangible assets, such as data and algorithms, become more valuable, an ability to 
safeguard those assets can become a differentiating factor between boom and bust. As a control 
connoisseur, China is deeply invested in managing within- and between-country data flows. In 
the modern era, the success of companies has become reliant on data and information flow, so 
stringent data regulations could hamper foreign operations. For example, global financial 
services firms need cross-border data flows to deliver core products to customers, among other 
services; impeded data flows would be a blow to such firms. According to the 2019 AmCham 
China White Paper, new data compliance, data localization, and data privacy rules have been 
implemented without considering the cross-border operational needs of foreign companies, 
affecting many US companies.93  
The new rules have affected the companies’ outlook on Chinese sentiment toward foreign 
businesses. In the 2019 AmCham China survey, close to 46% of respondents said that they felt 
less welcome in China than in 2017, and 34% reported no change.94  The surveys go on to reveal 
that “among technology and other R&D-intensive firms, 54% felt they were slightly or much less 
welcome than before.”95  
A Cybersecurity Law and Counter-Terrorism Law that went into effect in 2017 and 2016 
respectively enforce rigorous data storage laws.96 In particular, these laws subject entities that are 
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designated as critical information infrastructure (CII) operators to security reviews if they intend 
to move data offshore. The government has not yet specifically defined “CII operators,” but has 
instead released a general idea of CII as “if [they were] destroyed, suffering a loss of function, or 
experiencing leakage of data—it might seriously endanger national security, national welfare, the 
people’s livelihood, or the public interest.”97 In light of this description, CII requirements would 
apply to companies in industries like internet, telecommunications, and energy.  
Many companies have been required to use “secure and controllable” 98 network 
products, which are mostly made by Chinese companies. This move is seen by many as the 
government’s attempt to promote domestic products over foreign ones. Along with censorship, 
the Chinese government is careful to construct a controlled environment in which foreign 
companies operate. Previously, foreign companies would circumvent internet and censorship 
restrictions using Virtual Private Network (VPN) services. But according to Conny Jakobsson, 
there are now restrictions on which VPNs companies are allowed to use, ideally to boost the 
government’s surveillance of internet traffic.99 Additional research reveals that beginning in 
2016, the government started cracking down on VPN services, imposing on mainland VPN 
providers the need to obtain government approval.100  
 
Political Challenges: Foreign Investment Law 
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 China’s 2019 Foreign Investment Law (FIL) has been touted by both Chinese and foreign 
entities as an improvement on the China business climate. In a previous discussion on forced 
technology transfer and IP infringement, it was briefly mentioned that the FIL explicitly 
prohibits forced technology transfers by Chinese entities and improves IP protection policies. As 
a result, some foreign companies have praised the law. The EU Chamber of Commerce (EUCC), 
for instance, has said that “[the FIL] is surprisingly accommodating to concerns that [the EUCC] 
had.”101 But China law experts are pessimistic as to whether the FIL will meet foreign 
companies’ expectations.  
 According to Steve Dickinson, the central component in the FIL is the concept of 
national treatment.102 The idea refers to treating foreign-invested enterprises (FIE) the same as 
domestic private Chinese companies. FIE, as the law clarifies, is an enterprise incorporated under 
Chinese laws within the territory of China, and with all or part of its investment from a foreign 
investor. Previously, distinctions were made within FIEs between wholly owned foreign 
enterprise, contractual joint ventures, and equity joint ventures. Under the FIL, these distinctions 
no longer exist and have been uniformly put under the category of FIE.  
 Deng Xiaoping sought to attract foreign investors by offering various incentives, 
including tax breaks and discounted land and rent. According to Dickinson, beginning in the 
mid-2000s, Chinese companies started to complain that foreign companies had an edge over 
them due to the incentives.103 So the Chinese government began slowly reducing incentives over 
the years. The national treatment clause in the FIL may be the “final nail in the coffin.”104  
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 Foreign companies would be subject to the same tax rates applied to local firms, and they 
would be “entirely under the control of the CPC.”105 With regards to the latter claim, Dickinson 
gives the example that if Chinese officials mandate that a foreign company turn over its source 
code and other confidential information under the Cybersecurity Law, compliance will be 
required. National treatment does not guarantee foreign businesses full access to the Chinese 
market—Negative Lists are still very much at play. In a way, the existence of the NL negates the 
national treatment clause, because if there are sectors that only Chinese companies can enter, 
foreign firms will not be on equal footing with domestic ones.   
 
Overview of Political Challenges 
 In an economy so intertwined with politics, it is hard to distinguish which issues are 
political and which are not. The social credit system, market access, forced technology transfer, 
intellectual property protection, data security, and cybersecurity, among other issues, are 
variations of how the Communist Party exerts control over the economy and its components. The 
root of these problems lies in China’s political structure. Without the power to incite a political 
revolution that purges authoritarianism, foreign companies will continue to be under the 
almighty hand of the Communist Party.  
 Interestingly, the most recent trade war between the US and China does not add anything 
new to the conversation on political challenges encountered by businesses, because the 
Communist Party is still firmly in power. All the tweets, the back-and-forth tariff impositions are 
just noise. Consider the phase one trade agreement signed on January 15: China pledged to buy 
$200 billion worth of goods on top of 2017 levels in the next two years, promised to end all 
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forced technology transfer practices and strengthen IP policies, and agreed to open up the 
financial services market.106 Such provisions would barely change the current situation. China 
can point to its own FIL and say that it has already started fulfilling its promise to enhance IP-
related policies, though actual enforcement could look drastically different. China’s domestic 
monopolies in financial services can outcompete foreign firms, rendering an open market 
meaningless. In an odd nod to the Chinese state-led economic model, which is apparently 
anathema to Trump, the US compels China to buy a fixed dollar amount of goods—a move that 
only a state-directed economy can accomplish.  
 
Cultural Challenges 
 When Fuyao Glass Industry Co. took over a closed-down General Motors (GM) plant in 
Dayton, Ohio, in 2014, Cao Dewang, the founder and CEO, had a vision of bringing together 
Chinese people and Americans, jointly working towards the goal of expanding Fuyao’s glass 
parts all over the world. The Ohioans who were previously employed by GM were rehired by 
Fuyao. They were grateful for the new opportunity. It meant that families who would have 
otherwise moved elsewhere to find jobs, could stay in their hometown. But a heart-warming 
story of second chances soon turned ugly because of cultural frictions between Chinese 
supervisors and workers and American workers in the new Fuyao factory.  
 This story was the subject of a popular 2019 documentary called American Factory.107 
Through on-screen interviews and exclusive filming of closed-door meetings, among other 
scenes, the filmmakers capture the value of cultural harmony in a multicultural workplace. 
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Chinese supervisors could not understand the Americans’ emphasis on workplace safety. The 
Americans could not fathom how tirelessly the Chinese can work day in and day out. Fuyao even 
paid for some Americans to go to China to learn how Chinese factory workers operate and bring 
back lessons to teach the rest of the American factory workers. This conflict of values and 
operating style is not unique to factory work. Multinational companies in any industry will need 
to contend with cultural issues when working in a foreign country.   
 
Cultural Challenges: Cultural Integration 
 Human behavior is subject to many cognitive biases. For example, Tyler Johnson, sent to 
China to manage an international branch of Dell Technologies, professes that the first difficulty 
he countered was the integration of a different belief system and mindset. Given his expertise, 
Johnson believed he knew the “best way to do things.”108 He brought business strategies and a 
management style that worked in America and thought he would continue to propel the same 
processes in a different country. But these Johnsonian systems did not sit well with the Chinese 
employees, who had different views on strategies that are more suitable in China. For 
confidential reasons, Johnson never specified exactly the topics on which he and his employees 
clashed. Instead of considering his employees’ ideas, he continued his own methods and failed 
miserably. Some of his employees ended up leaving him.109 Johnson’s cultural misstep is 
believing that what works in the US must suit China.  
 Dell first became popular in the US through a direct-to-consumer approach, selling 
computers directly to people and businesses.110 This strategy was groundbreaking at the time 
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because it cut out the need for intermediaries. But doing business in China has culturally required 
intermingling between “backdoor channels with private dealings,”111 which sometimes included 
payoffs. This indirect model has been summarized by a famous Chinese phrase: 搞关系 (gao 
guanxi), meaning utilizing relationships.  
 The importance of social connections can be attributed in part to the dominant cultural 
philosophy in China: Confucianism. It is an idea that emphasizes harmony in society achieved 
through following certain rituals and moral codes. Deeply ingrained in the philosophy is the 
promotion of social connections between people.112 The Communist Party, under Xi, has been 
active in calling for a “renaissance of Confucianism” in China,113 even if the Party is really just 
selecting particular Confucian values that encourage obedience to the state.   
 Foreign businesses need to understand how to foster relationships with either local 
business partners or government officials. Especially given China’s notoriety for ambiguous laws 
applied on a case by case basis, knowing the right people can help a foreign business navigate 
through complexity. Coping with a relationship-driven strategy can be difficult for companies 
that are perhaps more used to dealing with clear-cut rules of the law. Conversely, companies who 
do cultural research on China before they enter can make the mistake of over-relying on guanxi-
oriented tactics. Xi Jinping’s crackdown on corruption several years ago made people more 
nervous about pursuing deals over dinner tables and other social occasions. That is not to say that 
social connections are no longer important. Different regions operate differently. In FTZs, such 
as Shanghai, where regulations and rules align more closely with those of Western countries, it is 
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likely to be more difficult to utilize guanxi blatantly to achieve business objectives. In smaller, 
more in-land regions, rules of engagement might be different. 
 The difficulty of cultural integration leads to an inharmonious work environment. Any 
foreign company in China will likely hire Chinese employees. Without an effort to understand 
how Chinese employees operate, companies may not have a cohesive team dynamic. Cultural 
integration can require modification of previous conceptions and habits to absorb new cultural 
information. The natural reliance on habits acquired from one’s own familiar culture is perhaps 
the root cause of many cultural challenges that businesses encounter. For example, Tyler 
Johnson had to modify his westernized management style to suit his Chinese employees. Back in 
the US, he was used to instructing his employees to achieve a certain target without telling them 
explicitly what to do. In China, he resorted to the same, familiar management style. He quickly 
became confused as to why his Chinese employees were not “motivated to get [the tasks] done” 
and they would “nod and agree, even though they didn’t understand what [he] was asking them 
to do.”114 In the West, business communication is straightforward and asking questions is not 
generally frowned upon. In China, however, the concept of “face” can prevent Chinese people 
from engaging in the same behavior as Westerners in business settings. In the instance described 
by Johnson, the Chinese employees perhaps did not want to lose face in front of their boss, so 
they decided to conceal their ignorance.  
 It is easy to assume the universality of certain cultural rules. For Westerners, the 
assumption perhaps comes from the dominant presence of Western values and ideals in 
multilateral institutions and global rules. Foreign companies face a trap of thinking that China 
will become more like the West as it grows richer. Greg Collins, a former global supply chain 
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executive turned professor, argues that perhaps it was out of hubris from the Westerners’ point of 
view that they can enter China and change it according to Western beliefs.115 The Western world 
made the assumption that China wants to be changed. Why wouldn’t a developing country want 
to follow the mold of a Western country and grow rich? Collins believes that Westerners 
underestimate how much China values its history. It is easy to forget the relative youth of 
democratic institutions and free market principles, compared to monarchical or dictatorial 
political structures that have dominated much of history. The concept of the Emperor is still very 
much alive today in China, especially after Xi scrapped the term limits of his presidency and his 
invocation of important values of the past like Confucianism.  
 
Cultural Challenges: Technology and Culture 
While many cultural values from China’s long history inform certain business practices 
and norms today, China’s culture is continuously evolving. The emergence of new technologies, 
such as mobile payments, engenders not only new modes of business operation and strategy but 
also novel behavior. Already in marketing practices, experts see minimal progress that Western 
parties are making in China due to an inability to adapt to changing consumer preferences, 
spurred by the infusion of new technologies in Chinese society. Marketing is a particularly apt 
arena to explore cultural challenges for foreign companies, because the success of a marketing 
campaign depends heavily on the companies’ grasp on Chinese culture and their ability to tap 
into the psychology of Chinese consumers. Megan Whitler, assistant professor at The University 
of Virginia, wrote an article on this very topic in the Harvard Business Review in June 2019.116 
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China has become a mobile-first society: as of August 2019, China had over 850 million 
netizens.117 Among all the Internet users, the proportion of those accessing the Internet through 
mobile phones increased to 99.1% from 98.6% at the end of 2018.118 This unparalleled mobile 
phone usage has created a new wave of consumer culture, which promptly revolves around “the 
creation of shareable, viral content and the presence of dominant, channel-straddling media 
giants.”119 The dominant media giants mentioned in the quote refer to the likes of Tencent and 
Baidu, which encompass platforms that span across many spectrums, including social media, 
gaming, and news media. Such an amount of market power accrued to a select few firms is 
virtually unheard of in the Western world, in which more stringent anti-competitive laws induce 
fiercer competition and less market concentration. The prevalence of the media giants in Chinese 
society means that most online activities that Chinese consumers engage in will be part of the 
sphere of these companies. According to Kleiner Perkins, a venture capital firm, more than half 
of Chinese netizens’ online activities are within the Tencent ecosystem.120  
Whitler believes that Western marketers are disadvantaged in a media landscape that is 
highly concentrated. The relatively greater platform diversity in the West has instilled in its 
marketers the habit to use a fragmented, multi-channel approach, covering as many targeted 
users as possible.121 While it may make sense to spread brand awareness through an inundation 
of advertisement, tailoring the message to specific users is much harder to achieve. TV, radio, 
and billboards, among other types of advertisement, generate disparate sources of data that may 
not be aggregated to construct a full consumer profile. America’s internet giants do a much better 
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job at collecting information from a multitude of netizen activities, but still lack in reach 
compared to their Chinese counterparts.  
The dominance in Chinese media platforms manifests not only in the platforms’ massive 
online presence, but also in their ability to shape the preferences of Chinese consumers. For one, 
the platforms have fostered a mobile environment in which content is king. Content can range 
anywhere from short, viral skits with famous influencers, or “key opinion leaders,” to live 
concerts where the audience can play around with the products that are being marketed and 
netizens can be entertained through virtual interaction.122 The success in such strategies has led 
Chinese marketers to center their efforts in creating engaging content that can change consumer 
behavior quickly. “The Chinese approach starts with thinking about content, information, and 
knowledge that could be engaging and shared,” said Danielle Jin, chief marketing officer for 
Visa Greater China, “it isn’t about advertising and price promotions.”123 
Knowledge about consumer behavior and culture is necessary for a foreign company to 
succeed. Assuming that the marketing styles agreeable to foreign audiences would be equally 
receptive in China may not work. Danielle Jin points to promotions as a typical Western strategy 
that unsuitable in China, given Chinese consumers’ preference for content shaped by stimulating 
mobile and in-person experiences.124  
Another key cultural difference is deployment speed, whether it be products or marketing 
campaigns. While the difference in deployment speed is not necessarily a result of technological 
differences between China and the Western world, the former’s platforms certainly play a big 








in the value of speed between Western countries and China is tough to pin down. Perhaps 
because China still considers itself as a developing country—though some may say this 
qualification is inappropriate for an economy of China’s size—its companies are more receptive 
to a growth mindset dominated by speed. As Whitler writes, “marketers in China make decisions 
more quickly than their Western counterparts do, mainly because firms in that fast-growing 
economy need to show momentum to keep investors on board.”126  
Western firms seem to adopt a different model, emphasizing economies of scale, 
efficiency, and perhaps most importantly, their bottom line. Under such a model, risky behavior 
that may not be profitable on a short time horizon is likely to be quashed. Whitler has observed 
that for certain Western firms’ Chinese operations, there is tension between local and global 
management. Local executives “are hampered by layers of global management that tend to slow 
down decision making, even as they interact with Chinese marketers accustomed to working 
quickly.”127  
The inertia of business culture is difficult to overcome. Western firms have been so 
dominant for so long that it is almost natural to carry on using the same strategies. Danielle Jin 
revealed that as she worked with Western firms prior to Visa, part of her job description tended 
to be that of planning with the client a year or two in advance to determine upcoming seasonal 
promotions. Planning far in advance is a rigid process “created over decades,” whereas Chinese 
marketers would consider “creating seamless content that cuts across multiple platforms and was 
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Finding success in the Chinese market is not just about understanding the cultural history 
of the country that contributes to modern practices, but also about capitalizing on current 
technological trends that are shaping the trajectory of Chinese consumer practices. In many 
ways, such as mobile payments and a bullet train system that spans the entire nation, China is 
ahead of the Western world.  
When foreign executives migrate to China to manage a new operation, they have to deal 
with the stressful reality that they are in a foreign environment filled with many technologies 
with which they have a comparative disadvantage. Executives cannot function at full capacity at 
work if they are having trouble living a completely different lifestyle. Conny Jakobsson and 
Henri Manner both hinted at such a difficulty. Jakobsson mentioned that some foreigners cannot 
handle the surveillance and restriction of freedom they feel they will undergo should they go to 
China.129 Manner talked of an emerging trend for foreign companies to hire local executives who 
are more adept at navigating the Chinese business environment.130 But staffing only locals also 
has the added risk of reducing diversity of thought and background. Manner and his firm advise 
local companies against such a practice for that exact reason.131 Therefore, foreign firms have the 
responsibility of ensuring that foreign executives are able to manage cultural unfamiliarity and 
promoting collaboration among local and foreign employees.  
 
Overview of Cultural Challenges 
Any foreign company can experience cultural challenges operating in China. The 
country’s cultural context determines how relationships are structured and how communication 
 
129 Interview with Conny Jakobsson 




occurs. There is bound to be misunderstanding and a misalignment of expectations in a 
multicultural workplace. If a foreign company decides to hire only locally for its Chinese 
operation, that still does not eliminate the prospect of cross-cultural interaction with the rest of 
the company.  
 Many historical values, such as Confucianism, inform modern cultural practices and 
behaviors. For example, Confucian emphasis on personal relationships encourages the utilization 
of social connections in business settings. In places where the judicial system is weak, knowing 
the right people can have an outsized effect on business success. Culture also dictates the 
harmony of a workplace. Foreign leaders in China can have a difficult time adjusting their 
leadership style to how Chinese workers typically operate. The possibility of a culture clash in 
the workplace is one of the reasons why foreign companies are turning to developing local talent 
for their operations.  
 The culture fostered by China’s emerging technologies can be more obstructive to foreign 
firms than traditional Chinese cultural values. Moving forward, the big question for companies is 
how they can successfully tap into the psychology of modern consumers through the utilization 
of unfamiliar platforms, such as WeChat, a powerful platform with many services like messaging 
and payment. From Kimberly Whitler’s research, it is evident that Chinese netizens consume 
content differently from the West—the former orient toward mobile-phone usage.132 As China 
embarks on its new mission of becoming a high-tech hub of the world, leading in technologies 
like artificial intelligence, a new culture that accompanies technological change may emerge.  
  
Business Process Challenges: Labor  
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 After the economic reforms in the late 1970s, foreign companies began looking to China 
as a prime destination for foreign investment due to its abundance of low-wage workers. 
According to one analysis, following the reforms, Chinese wages were 3% of average American 
wages and were also drastically lower than those of neighboring Asian countries like Thailand.133 
China’s low-cost labor coupled with globalization-fueled manufacturing transformed the country 
into the world’s manufacturing base. Supply chain executives focusing on cost-cutting would 
move factories to China to take advantage of China’s cheap labor. Foreign companies adopted an 
“in China, for the world” strategy, which in turn made China a major exporter. From 1978 to 
2017, Chinese exports increased from $10 billion to $2.2 trillion, and the average annual growth 
rate of China’s total foreign trade during that timeframe was far higher than the global 
average.134  
 As China began to cement itself in the world as a manufacturing powerhouse, it started to 
manufacture and assembling anything from textiles to high-end electronics. As the country 
became more prosperous, average incomes and labor costs began rising. A report by the 
Congressional Research Services indicates that from 2007 to 2018, China’s average monthly 
wage grew by 263%.135 This rapid increase in wages has become a burden to foreign companies. 
The business surveys released by AmCham China and the US-China Business Council reveal 
that labor cost increases have consistently ranked in the top 10 challenges for foreign companies 
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in the past decade. A lot of companies, especially in the apparel industry, have thus moved their 
production out of China and into Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam.136  
 Some companies do not have the luxury to move their operations outside of China. 
According to Greg Collins, China’s cheap labor built local supply chain ecosystems where 
suppliers, assemblers, and manufacturers are all in close proximity to one another to reduce 
inventory costs and lead time—the time between placing an order and delivering a finished 
product.137 Collins gives the example of Hewlett Packard (HP) printers. Previously, HP had 
assembled its printers in Singapore, but low labor costs in China enticed the company to move its 
assembly plant.138 Subsequently, HP’s major suppliers and component manufacturers decided to 
move with HP to remain closer to a major client.  
 Supply chain ecosystems have the benefit of stimulating development of necessary 
infrastructure, which serves as the base for further innovation and progress in manufacturing and 
assembling processes. This is especially true for electronics. As workers gain more expertise and 
as local infrastructure becomes more advanced, it can become substantially harder for a foreign 
company to seek the same expertise and infrastructure elsewhere.  
 China’s commitment to move up in the value chain of innovation and manufacturing will 
make finding talent costly. Success in high technology industries requires the proper utilization 
of skilled positions, which take money and time to develop. As many other rich countries are 
experiencing, China has a shrinking working population. According to a report by the US-China 
Business Council, “in 2018, China’s employed population declined for the first time ever, falling 
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by 540,000.”139 The law of supply and demand dictates that as supply of labor continues to 
shrink, wage rate will be pushed ever higher.  
Not only are companies experiencing labor shortages, they are also having difficulty 
finding the right skills to match their demand. A study conducted by J.P. Morgan Chase (JPM) 
on thousands of Chinese companies revealed that every firm had a skills shortage of “one degree 
or another.”140 The report recognized several structural challenges. College graduates, either 
domestic or overseas, did not possess the skills compatible with their positions. JPM quotes a 
survey that indicates 70% of companies “believed that what students learned in school had little 
practical value.”141 Survey results further reflect that the quality of vocational education needs to 
be improved and that the skill and education level of migrant workers are low, contributing to 
their incapability to land in high-skill positions that companies need.  
China’s wage rates are not distributed evenly throughout the country. Wealthier coastal 
regions, like Shanghai and Shenzhen, have higher wages than more inland regions, such as 
Anhui.142 This uneven wage distribution reflects the industries that Shanghai attracts, such as 
high technology and finance, among other valuable sectors. But because of Shanghai’s high 
living costs and restrictive residency system (hukou), migrant workers tend to favor inland 
China, creating labor shortages in Shanghai.  
Another labor challenge is restrictive labor laws. Such laws make it difficult for 
companies to fire or furlough employees. The ability to hire and fire people is integral to a 
company’s productivity and its success. Conny Jakobsson mentions a specific example of a joint 
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venture he had set up with an SOE.143 Freely firing employees became an issue in this 
partnership, because the SOE “only cares about whether its people have jobs,” but he just wanted 
to grow the business. Kyle Freeman also agrees that prohibitive labor regulations can become 
costly for foreign companies to operate.144   
 Labor cost can turn into a competitive advantage for some local companies. In addition to 
salary, labor cost can include employer social insurance and housing fund obligations. According 
to the USCBC, these components can add 37.25% to an employee’s salary on average.145 Certain 
Chinese companies have been able to bring down cost by cutting corners on paying social 
insurance. According to Kyle Freeman, the amount of social insurance employers pay depends 
on the salary of its employees. Sometimes companies have to contribute up to 40% of 
employees’ salaries.146 In such cases, companies would under-report salaries in order to pay less 
in social insurance, reducing overall cost for company operations. Foreign companies tend to not 
have this problem due to a high compliance threshold. Given that they are in foreign territory and 
that they are accustomed to a by-the-book operating style, they are most likely going to strictly 
adhere to rules. On the other hand, Chinese companies, considering their local relations and 
familiarity with domestic rules, are more comfortable with exploiting loopholes. If local 
companies incur fewer costs, they are in a better position to reduce price and in turn push foreign 
companies out of the market.  
   
Business Process Challenges: Competition 
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A common concern among foreign executives is Chinese competition. Opinions are 
mixed about whether the competition is spurred by honest and fair processes, or by the 
condemned practice of utilizing compliance loopholes and state assistance. General statistics 
reveal that in many markets, domestic Chinese companies have been increasing their market 
share. For example, according to a January 2020 report by The Economist, Chinese smartphone 
makers have increased their share of high-end phones from 12% in 2014 to 67% in 2018.147 
Similarly, Chinese car makers, after improving the quality of their cars, have taken a 38% market 
share in 2018, up 12% from 2014.148 These increases in market share were accomplished by 
private Chinese firms, which tend to not receive considerably more favorable treatment than 
foreign companies. The expanding market shares of such companies may reflect innovation. At 
the same time, however, Chinese nationalist sentiment in purchasing domestic products should 
not be overlooked. Xi Jinping has repeatedly tried to boost purchase of local products. For 
example, the Financial Times reported in December 2019 that the central government has 
released a directive for all of its agencies to replace any foreign technological products, hardware 
and software alike, with domestic ones within 3 years.149  
 Regardless of any meddling by the Chinese government, private Chinese companies are 
becoming fierce competitors to foreign companies because they are becoming more innovative. 
One potential indicator of this is the rapid increase in the amount of patent filings from China. 
According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, China’s patent filings in 2016 
accounted for 42.6% of the world’s patents.150 The story behind these numbers, more so than the 
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numbers themselves, speaks to China’s innovative drive. Due to Xi’s directive for high-
technology development in China, “Made In China 2025,” the country is in an innovative frenzy. 
The Chinese National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA), a government agency, 
considers patent creation to be innovation and has in turn called for government incentives to 
boost the number of domestic patent filings.151 To increase the amount of patents, CNIPA has 
eased the standards for what can be considered a patent.152 Subtle tweaks and design 
improvements are now sufficient for a patent filing. Therefore, China’s patent number does not 
necessarily mean that China leads the world in innovation.  
 Yet the Chinese government is undeniably making it easier for companies to innovate. In 
a report by Deloitte, a consultancy, on China’s innovative landscape, the authors write, “the 
Chinese government has been actively supporting the development of innovative start-ups by 
creating a favorable environment for them.”153 Chinese companies are also investing more in 
research and development (R&D). The Economics of Industrial Research and Innovation, an 
institution of the European Commission, releases an annual list of the world’s top 2500 
companies by R&D investment. Not only has the number Chinese companies on such a list been 
increasing every year, but also the R&D investment by listed companies is growing at a rate 
higher than the global average.154 As Chinese companies continue to invest more in innovation, 
foreign companies will have a much harder time keeping up. Already private Chinese companies 
have engendered new business models and practices not seen in the Western world. As 
mentioned previously, Chinese internet companies have created new strategies in marketing and 
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content promotion that uniquely capture the attention of Chinese consumers. Prevalent digital 
payment companies have created novel ways for consumers to purchase items and experiences. 
Because these trends are utterly unfamiliar in the West, foreign companies would have trouble 
competing with inventive Chinese firms.  
 
Business Process Challenges: Environmental Regulations 
 China’s meteoric rise did not come without costs. By putting economic development first, 
it failed to protect its environment. In 2007, the New York Times reported that “Chinese cities 
often seem wrapped in a toxic gray shroud.”155 The article further states that only 1% of city 
dwellers at the time breathed air that was safe according to EU standards.156 The extremity of the 
pollution has led to the Communist Party’s prioritization of environmental protection in recent 
years. National directives were implemented to reduce air pollution in 2013, water pollution in 
2015, and soil pollution in 2016.157 As a result of the government’s actions, recent data from 
2018 show that air pollution levels in major cities have decreased significantly in the 4 years 
prior to 2018.158  
 China’s environmental measures have affected businesses. Its strict enforcement of 
environmental regulations has disrupted certain companies’ supply chains. For example, 
AmCham China discusses a phenomenon whereby “in some provinces, during periods of heavy 
pollution, all factories in certain industries must limit or halt production, regardless of their level 
of compliance with existing standards.”159 Blanket bans on production out of consideration for 
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the environment can be very costly to businesses and consumers. Conny Jakobsson, whose 
company owns production facilities in China, has seen firsthand that “a lot of industries were 
forced to move or close down in compliance with regulations.”160 Kyle Freeman explains that 
several years ago when environmental regulations came into full effect, “changes occurred 
overnight.”161 An article released by Kyle’s firm further states that as of 2017, more than 80,000 
factories have been shut down by the anti-pollution campaign. Employers can face criminal 
liability should they violate environmental regulations.162 Municipalities have filed cases against 
noncompliant companies; Beijing alone filed around 13,000 as of 2017.163   
 In many cases, China’s regulations are unusually strict, sometimes technologically 
infeasible, even according to the standards of developed countries. AmCham China details a 
prime example in the synthetic resin industry. Strict emission standards have imposed limits on 
the discharge of wastewater and the chemicals it contains—byproducts of resin production. 
Evidently, “these standards set the level of phosphorus permitted in wastewater discharges so 
low that downstream wastewater treatment plants have been forced to adjust the composition of 
their wastewater treatment agents to comply.”164 
 There is an added problem of ambiguity when it comes to regulations in China; 
environmental rules are no exception. For example, a State Council directive has required 46 
directly administered municipalities and cities to separate all waste into four categories: ordinary, 
recyclable, organic, and hazardous.165 Many of the details surrounding the policy, such as 
timeline and precise implementation, have yet to be fleshed out. Nonetheless, such a policy can 
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affect the operations of waste-generating industries, such as tourism and retail, among other 
industries. Abruptly changing how such industries manage waste currently can expose businesses 
to unforeseen liabilities that accompany new environmental regulations.  
 
Overview of Business Process Challenges 
 China became an attractive production base initially because companies were able to take 
advantage of abundant, inexpensive labor. As the country became richer and began to focus more 
on higher-value industries, labor cost started to rise. Compounded by a shrinking working 
population, the cost challenge can only get worse. Considering China’s expertise in 
manufacturing and its infrastructure that grew to accommodate vast operations, China may still 
be a cheaper destination than its neighbors for industries that require sophisticated supply chains.  
 An ultra-competitive landscape can be a blow to profitability. Unfortunately for foreign 
companies, Chinese private companies are on the rise. A nationwide call for innovation has 
offered incentives for companies to progress rapidly, as evidenced by the growth of Chinese 
patents and the erosion of foreign companies’ market share. Chinese companies also benefit from 
the growing nationalist sentiment of buying strictly Chinese products, boosting sales. Although a 
lot of firms are outcompeting their foreign counterparts legitimately, others can be using shadier 
tactics like underreporting employees’ salaries to pay less social insurance. 
 Strict enforcement of environmental laws can be detrimental to businesses particularly in 
the automobile, mining, oil and gas industries, among others. The government can take heavy-
handed actions, such as inducing unexpected factory closures, which can severely damage a 
company’s supply chain. While China should be praised for its new-found anti-pollution passion, 
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rules should be more clearly defined and companies should be allotted a reasonable period of 
time to make proper adjustments.  
 
Conclusion 
 The Chinese market is a huge opportunity for global companies. Its emerging middle-
class is a harbinger of growing consumer spending power. Its conviction to be on the forefront of 
technology makes the country an alluring location for investment. With all of China’s attractive 
features, there are subtle and blatant warning signs to companies and nations. The West has tried 
to conform China to a liberal democratic model since its accession to the WTO but failed. China 
has since maintained a socialist economic model sprinkled with free market elements. The 
Communist Party takes advantage of a rules-based international order to further Chinese 
interests, complying or circumventing rules where appropriate. China is especially adroit at 
leaving ambiguity in its laws, which can disorient multinational companies and global 
organizations alike.  
Political challenges arise from policy directives from local and state officials. Various 
government measures that create barriers, either purposefully or otherwise, to foreign companies 
were examined in early sections above. Such barriers can manifest in the form of ambiguous 
wording in laws, like the newly implemented Foreign Investment Law and other regulations, or 
in the penalties government officials dole out through the social credit system.  
Cultural challenges to foreign companies were analyzed within the historical context of 
certain Chinese customs, such as the Confucian preference of social connections. Personal 
anecdotes of foreign business executives were relevant in this section, as they relayed the 
difficulty of adjusting to a foreign culture. For example, Tyler Johnson had to learn the unique 
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communication and work styles of his Chinese employees. New technologies have created novel 
Chinese consumption habits, posing an obstacle to foreign companies who have never 
encountered anything similar in the West.  
The final section of this paper delved into business process challenges that affect a 
company’s profitability. Labor cost, often the biggest cost component for any business, has 
become a chief challenge for companies. Aside from cost, maintaining market share, calculated 
by a company’s sales, has become a problem for some foreign companies. Many private Chinese 
companies, some of whom are becoming more innovative than foreign companies, are eating 
into the market share of foreign companies which tended to dominate sectors like smartphones 
and automobiles. A final disrupting force is the Chinese government’s inconsistent environment 




 So what should companies expect about business opportunities in China moving 
forward? As of this writing, the US and China are deeply involved in each other’s economy but 
are at odds with one another. The Trump administration has been especially hawkish on China. 
Not only did it initiate a trade war, but it has also restricted exports of US components to Chinese 
firms, such as Huawei, out of national security concerns. Further hammering Huawei, the 
President has called on America’s allies to ban Huawei from any national 5G contracts lest the 
Communist Party use backdoors in Huawei’s technology to snoop on citizens. Such high-level 
events are relevant for foreign companies, which include the greater US-China relationship into 
their business calculations. In the most recent AmCham China business climate survey (BCS), 
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the majority of companies are slightly pessimistic or pessimistic about the US-China relationship 
in the next two years—a trend that continued from the 2019 BCS.166 
 A common narrative has circulated among pundits, business leaders, and government 
officials of a potential US-China decoupling. There is evidence that this is already underway. 
According to analysis by the Rhodium Group, US FDI into China decreased by 51% from 2016 
to 2019, and Chinese FDI into the US declined by a staggering 93% during the same 
timeframe.167 While the decline in mutual FDI does signify a more fraught relationship between 
the two countries, a complete decoupling does not seem realistic. Instead, as Lindsey Ford of the 
Brookings Institute writes, “selective decoupling” is the more likely scenario.168 China is too 
important a market for foreign companies to utterly abandon. According to the 2020 BCS, 71% 
of respondents report that their China EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) margins are 
comparable or higher than those of their global operations.169 From the same survey, 20% of 
respondents ranked China as their first investment priority and 39% ranked China a top-three 
investment priority in their near-term plans.170  
 China is so integrated in global supply chains that it can be costly for foreign companies 
to pull out. Decades of manufacturing and assembly experience have given Chinese workers an 
expertise in those areas and have induced the creation of sophisticated infrastructure to 
accommodate complex supply chains for industries like electronics. The supply chain 
ecosystems in China would be difficult to replicate elsewhere—though companies that do not 
require complex operations have been relocating production to China’s neighboring countries, 
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which have lower labor costs. For examples on China’s importance to global supply chains, look 
no further than the impact of Covid-19, a novel corona virus that originated from China in 
December 2019, on multinational corporations. Apple, whose devices are assembled in China, 
announced on February 17, 2020 that it did not expect to meet revenue forecasts for the second 
quarter due to a slowdown in production in China.171 Along similar lines, the New York Times 
reported that Hyundai, a carmakers, had to shut down production in South Korea due to a 
shortage of Chines parts.172 China plays an integral role in many companies’ supply chains and 
will likely continue to do so in the future.  
 As the US-China trade war tension eased with the signing of a phase one trade deal, 
China has committed to buying an additional $200 worth of goods and services over the next two 
years. Given this substantial increase in future commerce with China, the US and China cannot 
completely sever ties with one another. However, there are signs that decoupling has been 
occurring. The Trump administration has cracked down on exports, such as semiconductors and 
chip technology, related to national security. Exemplifying tighter scrutiny on China’s 
investment strategy in the US, Trump signed into law the US Foreign Investment Risk Review 
Modernization Act (FIRRMA).173 FIRMMA gives the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States (CFIUS) greater visibility into investments in the US regarding critical 
technologies, such as 5G, and allows the CFIUS to block foreign investments, if necessary.  
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 China reciprocates a similar desire to decouple in sensitive technologies. Especially after 
experiencing export restrictions in important components from the US, Xi Jinping has started to 
emphasize the importance of China’s self-sufficiency. Xi has called for greater efforts in 
researching and developing core technologies.174 As the nationalist rhetoric on both sides 
becomes stronger, selective decoupling will only worsen. Covid-19 just might bring such a 
prospect to life. Throughout March 2020, China and America have been blaming each other for 
the virus and trading punches with the expulsion of journalists. The fight has turned particularly 
nasty verbally with Trump’s labelling of the virus as the “China virus” or “Wuhan virus.” On 
March 25th, Business Insider, a news source, reported that G7 countries had failed to deliver a 
joint statement because the US insisted on using the “Wuhan virus” label.175 As Xi is eager to 
improve his own reputation after public anger over government suppression of information 
related to Covid-19, he will point to the failings of the US and other Western countries in 
contrast to the temporary success China has achieved in preventing new domestic infections. 
These tit-for-tat verbal attacks will worsen an already-fracturing US-China relationship.  
 On the business side, the disruption to global supply chains due to the pandemic is 
prodding executives to think of new business strategies and risk-mitigation plans. Especially in 
the early days of the pandemic, when China was the only country on lockdown, global stock 
markets plummeted, signifying the weight China still has in the operations of many companies. 
In these unfortunate circumstances, companies will try to diversify their supply chains away 
from China. As the pandemic is still ravaging the world, it is difficult to know how 
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diversification will proceed. The hard reality may be that in a post-pandemic world, Western 
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